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Abstract: Within a framework of an overlapping generations endogenous growth model,
this paper examines the effects of China’s partially funded public pension on the fertility,
the economic growth and the family old-age security. Chinese are assumed to satisfy for
both having children and getting old-age material support from children. It is shown that
raising the firm contribution rate reduces the rates of fertility and intergenerational transfer,
and increases the economic growth rate. The individual contribution has no effect on the
above rates. This paper also finds the proper firm contribution rate interval to promote
economic growth, control population rationally and maintain some family old-age
security.
Keywords: Partially Funded Public Pension; Endogenous Growth; Fertility Rate; Family
Old-Age Security
JEL classification: H55; J13; D64; O40
1. Introduction
China is confronted with low per capita GDP and over-population. It is argued that
public pension system impacts economic growth and fertility rates (e.g. Nishimura and
Zhang, 1992, 1995; Zhang et al, 2001; Zhang and Zhang, 2003; among others).
The World Bank (1997), Feldstein (1999) and Wang et al. (2004) analyze China’s
partially funded public pension system combining social pool with individual accounts1.
China reforms its public pension system again in December of 2005. The system is
different from a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system and a fully funded one as follows: The
government establishes an individual account for each employee and a social pool for all
employees and retirees. Each firm contributes a percent of its payroll to the social pool,
while each worker contributes another percent of her wage to her individual account. The
social pool fund is used to pay the current retirees as pay-as-you-go pension benefits,
School of Insurance, Central University of Finance and Economics, China. Financial support from the
Humanities and Social Science Foundation of Chinese Ministry of Education (No. 06JA630079) is
gratefully acknowledged. The author is grateful to two anonymous referees and the editor for helpful
comments and suggestions. Any remaining omissions or errors are the author’s own.
1 The World Bank (1997) simulates several options for China and recommends a three-pillar system
based on an actuarial model. Feldstein (1999) analyzes the economics of a mixed pension system, and
considers several options to reform the pension system in China. Wang et al. (2004) use a computable
general equilibrium model to compare various options for financing China’s implicit pension debt and
to estimate the effects of pension reform on the sustainability of the system and on economic growth.
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whereas the accumulation in the individual account is used to pay the individual herself
when she retires as fully funded pension benefits. Each retiree receives funded pension
benefits from his individual account and PAYG pension benefits from the social pool.
Most of theoretical literature regarding pension study PAYG public pension and/or
fully funded public pension systems (e.g., Blanchard and Fischer, 1989; Zhang and Zhang,
1995; Zhang et al, 2001; Groezen et al., 2003; among others). Zhang and Zhang (1998)
analyze the effects of social security in a model with alternative motives of having
children. They show that social security increases per capita income growth when the
social security tax is not too high. Wigger (1999) employs a model in which parents derive
utility from having children and expect support from children to study the interrelation
between growth, fertility and PAYG-public pension size. It is shown that small sized
public pensions stimulate per capita income growth, but further increases in public
pensions reduce it. A rise in public pensions reduces fertility if they are either small or
large, and stimulates fertility if they are medium sized.
Chinese people generally satisfy for both having children and getting old-age
material support from children, which is called family old-age security below for
simplicity. This phenomenon is decided by economic development level. In this paper, we
confine our attention to the stage at which the government is only able to provide a basic
subsistence to the retired and it is necessary for each retiree to get some family old-age
security to be better off. Individuals rear children for two basic motives: enjoying having
children when young and obtaining some family old-age security when old. It is also a
behavior habit that the young during the working period appreciate their parents. This
behavior criterion can be called a self-evident or tacit agreement between parents and
children in China. Another reason for intergenerational transfer running from children to
parents is that the working-generation’s incomes are much more than those of the
retired-generation.
Employing an overlapping generations model with endogenous growth, this paper
examines the effects of the partially funded public pension on the fertility, the economic
growth and the family old-age security in China. It introduces the habit of material support
from children to parents into the model, and the altruism is always operative because it is a
behavior habit and a tacit agreement. It is shown that a rise in the firm contribution rate
reduces the rates of fertility and intergenerational transfer from children to parents, and
raises the growth rate of output per worker. The individual contribution has no effect on
the rates of intergenerational transfer, fertility and output per worker growth. At last, this
paper finds the proper firm contribution rate interval to promote economic growth, control
population rationally and maintain some family old-age security. China should choose an
optimal firm contribution rate in the proper firm contribution rate interval.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 examines the balanced growth equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes the proper firm
contribution rate. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. The model
This model extends those of Zhang and Zhang (1998) and Wigger (1999) by
introducing operative transfers from children to parents and replacing the PAYG or fully
funded pension systems with the partially funded pension system. There exists a closed
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economy composed of numerous individuals, firms and a government. The generation
born at the beginning of period t is called generation t with population Nt. Individuals in
the same generation are identical. The fertility rate for each of generation t is tn .
2.1 Individuals
Individuals live for two periods: working period and retirement period. Each
individual earns wage by supplying inelastically one unit of labor, makes pension
contribution, consumes part of her incomes, rears her children, makes gifts to her parent,
and saves the rest of the incomes in her working period. In her retirement period, she
consumes the fruits of her savings, gifts from her children, funded pension benefits (or
individual account pension benefits) and social pool pension benefits.
Each individual of generation t derives utility from her working-period consumption
tC1 , retirement-period consumption 12 +tC , the number of children tn+1 , and the
retirement-period consumption of her parent tC2 . Each individual maximizes her utility
by choosing the number of children, and the rates of saving and gift:
{ } ( ) tttttnqs CnCCUttt 2121,, ln1lnlnlnmax βρθ ++++= + , (1)
s.t. ( ) ttttt WsqhC −−−−= τ11 , (2)
( ) 1111112 )1(1)1( ++++++ ++++++= tttttttttt PIrWqnWsrC , (3)
where ( )1,0∈θ denotes the discount rate, and βρ , the weights for the number of
children and the retirement-period consumption of her parent. θρβ <<<0 since
individuals are assumed to care themselves more than their parents. tW is the wage, τ
the individual contribution rate, tq the gift rate to her parent, ts the saving rate, 1+tr
the interest rate, tI the individual account principal per worker, 1+tP the PAYG pension
benefits. The child-rearing cost rate is assumed to be
( )dtt nh += 1δ , (4)
where 1,0 ≥> dδ , such that the costs of rearing children are either linear or convex2.
01 >+ tn is the condition for population to last forever. 0>tq for all t because the
young appreciate their parents according to the tacit agreement.
Substituting equations (2)-(4) into equation (1), and differentiating with respect to
2 Zhang and Zhang (1995) and Wigger (1999) use the same type of child-rearing cost rate function.
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ttt nqs +1,, gives the first-order conditions:
121 /)1(/1 ++= tt CrC θ , (5)
( ) ttt CnC 211 /1/1 −+= β , (6)
( )( )( ) ( )tttttttt nCWqCWndh ++=+ +++ 1//1 12111 ρθ , (7)
Equation (5) states the tradeoff between the marginal utility of working-period
consumption and that of retirement-period consumption through savings. Equation (6)
states the tradeoff between the marginal utility of the representative individual’s
working-period consumption and that of her parent’s retirement-period consumption
through gifts. Equation (7) states the tradeoff between the marginal utility of child-rearing
costs and the marginal utilities of gifts from children to parent and number of children.
2.2 Firms
Firms produce a single commodity in competitive markets. The production function
( )tttttt kfNANAKF =),( is homogeneous of degree one, where tK denotes capital
stock in period t, tA labor productivity, ( )tttt NAKk = capital per unit of effective
labor. Firms make pension contributions at rate ( )1,0∈η on their payroll. According to
the product distribution, one can get that ( ) tttttttt NAwKrNAKF η++= 1),( . Euler’s
theorem gives
)( tt kfr ′= , (8)
[ ] ( )η+′−== 1)()(/ tttttt kfkkfAWw , (9)
where tw is the wage rate per unit of effective labor.
Following Saint-Paul (1992), Zhang and Zhang (1995, 1998, 2001), Wigger (1999),
among others, this paper adopts the endogenous growth model with Romer’s (1986) type
of capital externality. In order to ensure the existence of a balanced growth path for the
economy, the following particular form of tA is adopted:
)/( ttt aNKA = , (10)
where a is a positive technological parameter. Therefore ak t = , and
)(afrrt ′== , (11)
[ ] ( )η+′−=== 1)()(/ afaafAWww ttt for all t. (12)
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2.3 The government
The government credits the individual contributions tt NWτ into each individual
account, and the firm contributions tt NWη into the social pool. The individual account
balance is paid to the individual as funded pension benefits when she retires in the next
period:
tt WI τ= , (13)
The social pool is paid to the retirees in the current period as PAYG pension benefits:
( ) ttt WnP 11 −+= η , (14)
2.4 The goods market
The savings and the individual account principal of the young in period t generate
the capital stock in period t+1,
( ) 1+=+ tttt KNWs τ . (15)
3. Equilibrium analysis
Combining equations (10), (12), (15) and the labor force ( ) ttt NnN +=+ 11 yields
the growth rate of capital per worker:
( )
( )t
t
tt
tt
t
na
sw
NK
NK
g
+
+
==+ ++
1/
/1 11 τ . (16)
Analogously, the growth rates of wage and output per worker are also tg+1 .
A balanced growth equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium in which intensive
variables such as the gift rate, the fertility rate and so on are constant, while extensive
variables such as the wage, the retirement-period consumption and so on grow at the same
endogenously determined and constant growth rate of capital per worker. The following
analysis focuses on the balanced growth equilibrium.
3.1 Effect on fertility
Equating equations (5) and (6), and using the wage growth rate gives
( ) )1()1(1 rgn +=++ β
θ
. (17)
This familiar equation is in fact the modified golden rule. Substituting equations (17) and
(12) into equation (16), arranging yields
( )ηβ
θ
τ +=+ 1zs , (18)
where )()(
)1(
afaaf
ra
z
′−
+
= .
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Some manipulation gives
( ) ( )( )
( )dd
zh βθρβ
θρβρθθηρηρθβθη
+++
+−++−+++−
=
21
, (19)
( )( )[ ] ( )
dd
zzzdq βθρ
ηηρθηβη
+++
++++++−
−=
11
. (20)
Differentiating h with respect to  gives
0<∂∂ ηh . (21)
Using equation (4) yields
0<∂∂ ηn . (22)
Raising the firm contribution rate reduces the fertility rate. It is because that a rise in
the firm contribution rate decreases the wage income. Thus, workers decrease the
child-rearing costs by reducing the fertility rate. Moreover, an increase in the firm
contribution rate means higher PAYG pension benefits, which renders children as a means
of securing old age income less important and tends to reduce the fertility rate.
3.2 Effect on growth rate
Applying equation (17) and the effect on the fertility rate gives
0>∂∂ ηg . (23)
Raising the firm contribution rate increases the growth rate of output per worker.
This is because there exists a negative relationship between the growth rate of output per
worker and the fertility rate, and raising the firm contribution rate reduces the fertility rate.
It can also be interpreted by equations (16) and (18): Raising the firm contribution rate
induces a fall in the denominator of the right-hand side, thereby the growth rate of output
per worker increases.
3.3 Effect on gift rate
Differentiating q in equation (20) with respect to  yields
0<∂∂ ηq . (26)
Raising the firm contribution rate reduces the gift rate. There are two reasons: On the
one hand, a rise in the firm contribution rate induces the decrease in the wage, which leads
to the young makes fewer gifts to their parents. On the other hand, raising the firm
contribution rate induces the increase in the PAYG pension benefits, which renders the
gifts less important for the old.
Individual contribution has no effect on the rates of fertility, output per worker
growth and gift because mandatory savings (individual contributions) crowd out private
savings by one-for-one. Summarizing the above results yields the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Raising the firm contribution rate decreases the rates of fertility and
gift, and increases the growth rate of output per worker. The individual contribution has
no effect on the three rates.
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4. Proper firm contribution rate
4.1 Economic goals
The proper firm contribution rate depends on economic goals. First, China as a
developing country with low per capita GDP and over-population needs high economic
growth. Second, it is necessary for China to rationally control population size. Third, some
family old-age security is necessary because the government cannot bear too heavy
pension burden.
On the one hand, the population should be reduced or maintained at the original
level, namely, 11 ≤+ n . Substituting it into equation (19) and arranging gives
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ηρβθρθθρβθ
βθρδβρβθρθθρθβη =
−+++−
+++−−++−+≥
z
ddz
2
2
. (27)
On the other hand, the population cannot be reduced unboundedly. Substituting the
condition for population to last forever, 01 >+ n into equation (19) and arranging yields
( ) ( )
( ) ηρβθρθθρβθ
ρβθρθθρθβη =
−+++−
−++−+
<
z
z
2
2
. (28)
The correspondence relation between the intervals of  and n is ηηη <≤ for
01 ≤<− n .
The family old-age security means that 0>q , namely, workers certainly provide
some material support to their retired parents. Substituting 0>q into equation (20) and
arranging gives
( )
( ) ( ) ηρθ
ρθβη ˆ
11
1
=
++++
−+−
<
zdzd
zdzd
. (29)
4.2 Economic goals and 
Comparing η with ηˆ gives ηη ˆ> . Comparing η with ηˆ gives ηη ˆ< if
( )( ) zddz θρ
ρδ
+++
>
1
. Consequently, if the firm contribution rate is η , the population
and the economic growth maintain their original levels. If the firm contribution rate is in
the interval, ( )ηη, , then the population decreases and the economic growth increases. If
the firm contribution rate is in the interval, ( )ηη ˆ, , then the population falls in a rational
extent, the economy grows rationally, and some family old-age security is maintained.
The relationship between 1+n, g, q and  is shown as Figure 1. In Region , ηη < ,
the population continues to increase, and the economic growth rate is very low,. If ηη = ,
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the population maintains at the original level and the output per worker growth rate is
( ) 11 −+ βθr . In Region , ηηη ˆ<< , the population is reduced in medium size, the
economic growth rate is high but not too high, and the intergenerational transfers from
children to parents are positive. If ηη ˆ= , the intergenerational transfers vanish. In Region
, ηηη <<ˆ , the population is reduced largely, and the economic growth rate is very
high. Obviously, Region  is desirable because it satisfies the three economic goals.
Proposition 2: The proper firm contribution rate interval to promote economic
growth, control population rationally and encourage some family old-age security is
( )ηη ˆ, if the parameters satisfy certain condition.
5. Conclusions
Under an overlapping generations model with endogenous growth, this paper
examines the effects of China’s partially funded public pension on the fertility rate, the
economic growth and the family old-age security. In such a pension system, individual
0
0
g
11 −+βθ
r
1+n
1
q
0 
n
η ηηˆ

n

n
 
 
Figure 1. The relationship between 1+n, g, q and 
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contribution is accumulated in the individual’s account, while firm contributions are
collected into the social pool. This paper introduces the habit of material support from
children to parents into the model, and the altruism is always operative because it is a
behavior habit and a tacit agreement in China. Individuals and firms make pension
contributions in this model instead of individuals only make in the literature.
This paper shows that a rise in the firm contribution rate reduces the rates of fertility
and intergenerational transfer from children to parents, and raises the growth rate of output
per worker. This result is different from those of Zhang and Zhang (1998) and Wigger
(1999). In this model, the individual contribution crowds out the private savings by
one-for-one; it has no effect on the rates of intergenerational transfer, fertility and output
per worker growth. This paper also finds the proper firm contribution rate interval
corresponding to the three economic goals.
China’s population size is too large and the per capita GDP is low, in the meantime,
the government bears too heavy burden of pension payments. It is necessary for China to
choose an optimal firm contribution rate in the interval shown in Proposition 2. By virtue
of that, China can not only promote economic growth and control its population rationally,
but also encourage some family old-age security to reduce the government’s heavy
pension burden. As for the individual contribution, its rate should be set on the level at
which workers can bear, and when they retire, the sum of the accumulation in individual
accounts and the social pool benefits can maintain a basic subsistence.
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